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 TOWARDS A SECURE AND SUSTAINABLE CRITICAL INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE (CII) – A STUDY ON THE POLICY AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORKS IN MALAYSIA 
 
Sonny ZULHUDA 
Multimedia University 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The increasing reliance of critical infrastructures (such as those operating the national 
communications, energy, transport, and defence systems) on a computerized and networked environment 
imposes an enormous security task for both their operators and users. The fact that attack to critical 
infrastructure is not merely an ordinary criminal matter but rather an issue of national security makes it more 
urgent for policy-makers to come up with policies or laws addressing various issues ranging from 
information sharing to public-private cooperation, from technical solutions to security procedures, and from 
public awareness to law enforcement. Looking at the scope it covers and the role it plays, the law on critical 
information infrastructures is so critical not only because it is part of national security measures, but also 
because the law may well determine the level of national readiness for landing a global investment. This is 
true because major business processes are now dependent on the secure information technology tools and 
networks. The biggest task ahead for policy-makers is therefore to prepare the best legal framework to 
protect the country’s critical information infrastructure and, at least, to manage and minimise the security 
risks that surround a networked environment. This paper hypothesizes that security risk management of the 
critical information infrastructure can not be effectively sustained without a comprehensive framework that 
consists of, among others, good policies and legal framework. In Malaysia, the legal framework on CII can 
be found in several pieces of legislation. This paper seeks to discuss the role of the law especially on the 
restriction of access to and movement in the perimeters of CII as well as the law on computer and network 
security. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The increasing reliance of critical sectors on the 
computer networks and information system provides 
an enormous and unprecedented task. As one 
commentator described, for the first time in history, 
an individual armed with nothing more than 
technical expertise, a computer system, and a 
network connection could theoretically bring a 
nation to its knees (Condron, p. 42). The fact that an 
attack to critical infrastructure is not merely an 
ordinary criminal matter but rather an issue of 
national security makes it more urgent for 
governments worldwide to come up with the 
necessary policies, plans or laws addressing issues 
ranging from information sharing to public-private 
cooperation, from criminal laws to national security, 
and from public awareness to law enforcement.  
 
The protection of CII has been an international 
concern. It was reported by the OECD in May 2008 
that many countries have national plans or strategies 
for protecting critical infrastructure. These strategies 
generally define ‘critical infrastructure’ as physical 
or intangible assets whose destruction or disruption 
would seriously undermine public safety, social 
order and the fulfilment of key government 
responsibilities. Such damage would generally be 
catastrophic and far-reaching. Sources of critical 
infrastructure risk could be natural (e.g. earthquakes 
or floods) or man-made (e.g. terrorism, sabotage). 
 
This concern is natural given the fact that we 
gradually step into an electronic environment where 
most documents are being digitised and transactions 
computerised, such as what is happening with 
revenue collection and many other applications. 
Given the security challenges that face electronic 
environment such as this, we are left with one 
nagging question, ‘how secure are those systems?’ 
The answer to this question will undoubtedly have a 
huge implication on the life of the community and 
country as a whole.  
 
2. THE NATURE OF PROTECTION OF CII 
2.1 Scope and definition of CII 
The term ‘critical information infrastructure’ (CII) 
has been given different definitions and scope in 
different countries. Countries put it in their own 
perspective depending on the national needs and 
circumstances. It was reported by German agency 
(Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik: 2004), whereas it is possible to 
identify some common structural elements between 
countries, the measures taken so far, the functions 
performed by the responsible organisations and the 
degree of protection achieved to date remain widely 
different. The term CII itself involves some 
terminologies worth deliberating. These include the 
term ‘critical’, ‘infrastructure, and ‘information 
infrastructure’. 
 
2.1.1 ‘Critical’ 
What makes the protection of CII an important 
national security interest is its ‘criticality’ criteria. 
CII is about the reliance of a nation or public to 
those information assets. It must be the information 
assets which are so enormously important to the 
extent that the loss, lack or inefficiency of which 
would lead to a serious impact.  
 
Countries vary in their perception of how serious 
is serious. It may involve a “major detrimental 
impact on the availability or integrity of essential 
services, leading to severe economic or social 
consequences or to loss of life” as defined by the 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 
(CPNI), UK. In the US, criticality is associated with 
the debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, 
or any combination of those matters (Condron, p. 
406). Meanwhile, according to the National 
Information Security Center of Japan, such criticality 
is consigned to the “great disruption of people’s 
social lives and economic activities”. Malaysia, on 
the other hand, views criticality on the “severe 
impact that may be caused to national economic 
strength, national image, national defence and 
security, government capabilities to function, public 
health and safety” (See: CNII Portal Malaysia). 
 
The above observation shows that ‘criticality’ 
has various dimensions but all share the common 
nature of being the utmost public and national 
concern. Arguably, the differences originated from 
different public policy adopted by each country.  
 
2.1.2 ‘Infrastructure’ 
The word ‘infrastructure’ lexically means “the basic 
structures and facilities necessary for a country or an 
organisation to function efficiently.” It is observed 
that the meaning and scope of the word used in the 
plans, strategies and laws on critical information 
infrastructures by various governments do not depart 
from its dictionary meaning in general.  
 
In many countries CII policies cover tangible 
and intangible assets and production or 
communications networks. Australia, for example, 
refers to “physical facilities, supply chains, 
information technologies and communication 
networks.” The United Kingdom refers to ‘essential 
services and systems including physical and 
electronic.’ The US refers to the ‘system and assets, 
whether physical or virtual.’ Slightly uncommon 
proposition is however found in Germany 
(‘organisations and institutions’) and Japan 
(‘business entities providing highly irreplaceable 
services’). Meanwhile, Malaysia refers to ‘assets, 
systems, and functions.’  
 
2.1.3 ‘Critical Information Infrastructure’ 
The term ‘critical information infrastructure’ (CII) 
refers to infrastructure which is related to 
information and information assets. For example, a 
civil aviation sector comprises of certain 
infrastructure including airplanes, personnel, 
navigation system, information and communications 
systems, towers and airports, administrative as well 
as regulatory infrastructure – this all constitutes the 
critical sector of the aviation system. CII is one part 
of these: it is all about the information and 
communications system operated for and by the 
aviation system. In this respect, the protection of 
critical information infrastructure refers exclusively 
to the security and protection of the IT connections 
and IT solutions within and between the individual 
infrastructure sectors. 
 
The Australian Government describes critical 
information infrastructure as ‘a subset of critical 
infrastructure, comprises those communications, 
information and other technologies and systems used 
to underpin Australia’s economic activities and 
delivery of key government services. In Malaysian 
Government’s perspective, the National Cyber 
Security Policy (NCSP) was outlined to address the 
risks to the Critical National Information 
Infrastructure (CNII) which comprises of ‘networked 
information systems of the ten critical sectors.’ 
Therefore it is noted that CII includes the 
information systems (information, communications 
and computer networks) used by each designated 
critical infrastructures such as banking and finance, 
broadcasting and telecommunication, energy, water 
services, transport, health, emergency services, 
defence, etc.  
 
2.2 Key elements of CII protection 
In the protection of critical information infrastructure, 
several issues require proper attention such as the 
public-private cooperation, clear job distribution, 
and transparent national system as well as social and 
industrial awareness.  
The inclusion of private sector is imperative. 
Based on the report by the Bundesamt fur Sicherheit 
in der Informationstechnik of Germany, 
approximately 90% of national critical 
infrastructures are actually in the hands of private 
sector. Those companies are also arguably best 
placed to assess what systems and sub-systems 
within their own business require special protection. 
Therefore, it is more strategic and effective for the 
purpose of control and enforcement.  
 
There is an urgent need to avoid duplication or 
overlapping of functions between organisations and 
agencies. Therefore, clarity of functions, 
responsibility and procedures (such as procedures for 
information, cooperation and reporting) is essential. 
On the other hand, there is also an important 
prerequisite in the form of transparency of the 
national system for the protection of a state’s own 
critical infrastructures. Central in this issue is the 
availability of freely-accessible information. 
 
Last, but not the least, proper awareness at all 
levels of industry, state and society is a must while 
sectoral cooperation and international cooperation 
are a matter of urgency as critical infrastructure 
protection should not stop at public frontier or 
national border only. 
 
2.3 Sources of threats to CII 
2.3.1 Inadvertent or negligent incidents 
The interconnection that we live by today is not free 
from risks and threats: deliberate or otherwise, 
tangible or otherwise. Technical glitches or 
negligence to the operation and maintenance of the 
information assets in this aspect could theoretically 
bring a nation to its knees. The magnitude of the 
problem due to the interruption of information 
system in the critical infrastructure is best illustrated 
in several incidents to follow.  
 
In UK, a glitch caused disruption to the traffic 
computerised control system that led to 
dysfunctional lights across central London and 
caused long queues on main roads (“Computer glitch 
causes road jams,” BBC News, 5th April 2009). 
Meanwhile, a computer breakdown at Taipei's 
international airport caused chaos and long queues, 
and forced immigration officials to hand-record 
departing passengers' data, taking the risk that 
certain blacklisted individuals or criminal suspects 
may be let free to flee the country (“Computer glitch 
causes chaos at Taiwan airport,” Asia-Pacific News, 
6th
 
 January 2009). 
Singapore experienced technical glitches on its 
electricity system in 2002 when a computer glitch 
had resulted in the worst blackout in over a decade in 
the island country. It ultimately paralysed parts of 
Singapore for ninety minutes and prompted an 
emergency valve to close, cutting off the flow of the 
gas to one of two Singaporean providers of the fuel, 
the SembCorp Gas. The lack of gas consequently 
tripped seven power plants. As a result, there was an 
8% shortfall in the amount of electricity produced 
(“Computer glitch behind worst blackout in decade,” 
The Straits Times, 15th
 
 August 2002.).  
Similar incidents have hit Malaysia, too, 
affecting public facilities and critical sectors such as 
railway operation, stock exchange, postal system as 
well as government agencies. In a dramatic incident, 
a computer system malfunction caused Bursa 
Malaysia, the national stock exchange, to suspend a 
whole-day trading (“Bursa grinds to a halt,” The Star, 
4th
 
 July 2008). According to the President of the 
Malaysian Investors Association, such 
unprecedented interruption to the stock trading was 
estimated to have caused the Government RM 1 
million in stamp duty from contracts done while 
brokers stood to loose RM 5 million in the 
non-trading day. Arguably, these monetary losses 
were not the only thing incurred: stock exchange and 
Malaysian economy in general may suffer from 
credibility losses. 
2.3.2 Deliberate attack 
The origin of the above incidents is more of 
technical and non-deliberate failures; one of many 
threats to information security. Others come from 
deliberate acts that may trigger liability under a 
criminal law. As one commentator puts it, the annals 
of cyber crime now contain examples of successful 
attacks against air traffic control systems, sewerage 
treatment facilities, and large electronic retailers, as 
well as the occasional mail bombing of 
governmental services and defacement of 
governmental websites (Grabosky, p.38). These 
attacks can prove more fatal or catastrophic, and 
such threats are not esoteric but are real and being 
exploited on a daily basis, and the consequences of 
such attacks are significantly harmful. 
In March 1997, a teenager hacked into a 
telephone company computer that serviced the 
Worcester Airport, Massachusetts. This caused 
telephone services to the control tower, the airport 
fire department, airport security and various other 
departments to be suspended for more than six hours. 
The attack caused a ripple effect of delayed and 
cancelled flights across the country, leading to 
serious financial losses by the airport and several 
airlines (Taylor, p. 25).  
 
As illustrated above, anger and disappointment 
can turn into a dangerous source of attack to critical 
infrastructure. On other incident, it was noted by 
Taylor (p. 25) that a disgruntled former Chevron 
employee disabled the firm’s alert system by hacking 
into the company’s computers. The attack was not 
discovered until the system failed to notify engineers 
of the release of noxious chemicals into the air at a 
plant in Richmond, California, USA. This incident 
put millions of people in the western US and Canada 
at risk. 
 
3. POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN 
MALAYSIA 
Many countries realise that there is a pressing need 
to pass legislation that protect the CII. This 
reinforces the fact that CII is a national concern, and 
its protection needs to be backed by law and 
enforcement including penalties and sanctions. The 
law is the reason for the states to allocate special 
funds for the provision, operation and enforcement 
of the protection of CII. 
 
3.1 The national policy framework 
Malaysia as a fast-developing country increasingly 
adopts information technology and computer 
network in almost all sectors of its development. It is 
clearly stipulated in the latest national development 
plan (the 9th
 
 Malaysia Plan), which emphasises that a 
greater adoption and usage of ICT will become 
strategically more important. The country will need 
to increasingly harness ICT to improve productivity 
and competitiveness as well as progress to high 
value added and knowledge-intensive economic 
activities. The Government will build upon and 
enhance ICT capacity for ubiquitous access, develop 
core competencies, narrow the digital divide and 
expand usage of electronic transactions as part of the 
overall effort to empower the populace to partake in 
the growing networked economy. Simultaneously, 
this will allow for the greater expansion of 
ICT-related industries and services (The Ninth 
Malaysia Plan, p.141). 
In order to realise this, it outlines, among others, 
information security as the focus in this period of 
development. For that reason, “efforts will be 
intensified to improve information security in order 
to enhance confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of online information systems” (The Ninth Malaysia 
Plan, p.152). On top of that, the aim is to enhance 
the integrity of networked systems, increase trust and 
confidence in online mechanisms and improve 
quality of services, among others, through 
compliance with information security management 
standards and best practices. In particular, these 
aspects will be of specific importance to the agencies 
operating the critical national information 
infrastructure (The Ninth Malaysia Plan, p.153). 
 
It is noteworthy that the Plan makes a specific 
stipulation and places a specific emphasis on the 
protection of critical national information 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, this emphasis has not 
been backed up by a specific legislation or legal 
instruments that comprehensively address all the 
elements of CII. Instead, the Government of 
Malaysia in 2006 has set up a national policy in the 
form of National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP), 
which is closely related to the protection of national 
critical information infrastructure albeit emphasis 
given on a more restricted context of cyber security.  
 
In the preceding sections, this paper examines 
certain Malaysian statutes that are relevant with the 
protection of CII in the country. This study discovers 
that certain significant remedies can be found in law 
relating to the protection of restricted places as well 
as law on internal security. 
  
3.2 The law that restricts the access to and 
movements in the perimeters of CII 
One way to protect the security of critical 
information infrastructure is to prevent, restrict or 
regulate the access to and the movement within the 
perimeter of those assets. This is one important 
aspect of information security, i.e. the control of 
access or in other words the physical aspect of 
information security. By controlling the access 
physically or restricting the movement, only those 
with a clear and legitimate authority would be 
allowed entry or access. This is crucial to ensure the 
confidentiality of information infrastructure while at 
the same time safeguarding the integrity of the assets 
and their availability for use and services intended.  
 
3.2.1 Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 
1959 
In Malaysia, the legislation that closely deals with 
this matter is in the form of the Protected Areas and 
Protected Places Act (‘PAPPA’) 1959 (Act 298). This 
Act, having been revised in 1983, is aimed at 
providing for protected areas and places. 
 
‘Protected area’ means any area declared to be a 
protected area by virtue of section 4 of the Act. 
According to this section, such declaration will be 
made by an Order of the Minister “if it appears to 
him to be necessary or expedient that special 
measures should be taken to control the movements 
and conduct of persons therein.” ‘Protected place’, 
on the other hand, is defined as “any premises 
declared to be a protected place by virtue of the 
provisions of section 5.” This section further 
stipulates that if in respect to any premises “it 
appears to the Minister to be necessary or expedient 
that special precautions should be taken to prevent 
the entry therein of unauthorised persons he may by 
order declare the premises to be a protected place for 
the purposes of this Act.” 
 
As to the effect of any Order passed under this 
section, it is provided that “no person shall be in 
those premises unless he is in possession of a 
pass-card or permit issued by such authority or 
person as may be specified in the order, or has 
received the permission of an authorised officer on 
duty at those premises to enter the same.” The 
contravention of or failure to comply with any of the 
provisions in section 4 or 5 is an offence that may 
trigger an imprisonment for a term of two years or a 
fine of one thousand Ringgit or both (section 7). 
 
3.2.2 Ground for restriction 
As mentioned above, both sections 4 and 5 of the 
PAPPA 1959 stipulate that the ground for taking 
actions made under such sections is if it appears to 
be necessary and expedient. There is however no 
express term in the Act that explains situations or 
grounds on which it is ‘necessary’ or ‘expedient’. It 
is argued that such requirements should be put in the 
correct legal perspective. According to the rules of 
interpretation of the statutory provisions 
(Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, section 17A), a 
construction that would promote the purpose or 
object underlying the Act must be preferred to a 
construction that would not promote that purpose or 
object. This PAPPA 1959, it is observed, aims at 
protecting some places or premises due to their 
importance for public in general. The fact that the 
Act grants significant powers to police and armed 
forces suggests that this relates to a public order and 
national security. This is also supported by a high 
level of security measures provided in s. 10 that can 
be taken in order to prevent an entry or any attempt 
to enter the protected areas and places.  
 
There are so far no reported cases involving the 
interpretation or explanation of the provisions of the 
1959 Act. There are, however, some incidents of 
violation under the PAPPA 1959 reported though 
they are not very helpful in explaining the law. In 
one unreported case in Klang (a district) Magistrate 
Court on 11th July 2005, five people were charged 
for trespassing into Dock 3 of the West Port Klang, 
Selangor, a site declared as protected area under the 
PAPPA 1959. At that time, the said dock was used by 
the US aircraft carriers USS Nimitz to harbour for an 
official visit in Malaysia (“5 dituduh ceroboh 
kawasan USS Nimitz [5 were accused of trespassing 
USS Nimitz],” Utusan Malaysia, 12th July 2005). It 
was further reported that two of them, who were 
there to take pictures of the carrier out of hobby, 
pleaded guilty as charged. At the hearing, the 
prosecutor had urged that the court should consider 
public interest and national security. Azmil 
Muntapha Abas J. convicted the two and punished 
them with the maximum fine of RM 1,000 each (“2 
lelaki didenda RM 1,000 ceroboh rakam gambar 
Nimitz [2 men fined RM 1,000 for trespassing on 
Nimitz],” Utusan Malaysia, 19th
 
 November 2005).   
Malaysia can borrow some guidance from a 
Singaporean court that has in 1999 dealt with the 
matter based on their Protected Areas and Protected 
Places Act 1963 (which is in pari materia with the 
Malaysian provision) in the case of Lim Ah Heng & 
Anor (Singapore High Court, 1999). In this case, 
which substantially dealt with the issue of illegal 
dumping, a question arose as to whether or not the 
site in issue, an Air Force military training area 
declared as a protected place under the Singaporean 
Act, constitutes a ‘public place’ for the purpose of 
illegal dumping offence. This restriction against a 
military training site indicates that this law deals 
with matters of national security and public safety. 
 
3.2.3 Restriction beyond physical movements 
Meanwhile, another aspect of this Act worthy of 
discussion is the effect of restriction to be made 
under the Ministerial Order. This law does not 
merely regulate physical restriction per se—contrary 
to the first impression people get from reading this 
law. Instead, the restriction also covers restriction on 
movements and conduct of persons in a protected 
place.  
 
Neither ‘movement’ nor ‘conduct’ is being 
defined in this Act. Therefore the meaning of 
conduct in this case would be general and lexical, 
and again, regard has to be given to the purpose of 
the Act itself, namely to provide for the control and 
restriction within the protected areas and protected 
places. While movement would be generally 
physical, conduct is not necessarily so as it could 
refer to a non-physical or non-tangible conducts. 
This would arguably include those electronic 
activities that are potentially detrimental to the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
information system and assets (information 
infrastructure) within such designated area or place. 
The example of this would be the unauthorised or 
malicious use of wireless or hand-held devices that 
may interrupt with the information and 
communications system in the designated area or 
place.  
 
This proposition can borrow some support from 
the Government security-related circular issued by 
the National Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Malaysia on 31st of January 2007 (No. 
KPKK(R)200/55 Klt. 8(2), dated 31st
 
 January 2007), 
restricting the use of handheld devices and any other 
information and communications gadgets. The 
circular, issued to all government agencies including 
the ministries, federal and state offices, statutory 
bodies and local governments, stipulates that key 
administrative areas and places where official secrets 
and security-implicated matters are discussed, have 
to be designated as ICT-restricted zones to enhance 
the protection of vital information. Therefore, it 
instructs the restriction of unauthorised gadgets from 
being brought into high-security government 
premises. The ban, it says, will prevent spying and 
the leaking of sensitive information or official 
secrets, which could jeopardize national security. It 
also noted that the widespread use of these devices, 
specifically camera phones, have serious 
implications on homeland security as they can be 
abused to gather or even transmit information in any 
form, including unauthorized data or digital images.  
The direct consequence of this legislation is the 
control of access and movement into or within the 
designated protected areas and places. Given the 
nature of the Order and the power it grants to 
authorised officer, it is argued that this law 
constitutes a crucial instrument in safeguarding the 
nation’s critical information infrastructure. This is 
however only true if the areas and premises that host 
the critical infrastructure are first declared by the 
Minister as ‘protected areas’ or ‘protected places.’  
 
3.2.4 Appraisal 
There have been a number of Orders being declared 
by the Malaysian Government in pursuant to section 
4 and 5 of the PAPPA 1959. It is found that the 
designation of protected areas and places under the 
Act focuses on certain grounds such as national 
defence and security, law enforcement, public safety 
and food, and general utilities and public 
infrastructure as well as smooth government 
functions and services. By virtue of these Orders, the 
authority to restrict the movement, entry or conduct 
in the designated protected places has been rested on 
the Chief Government Security Officer (CGSO) of 
Malaysia under the command of the Prime 
Minister’s Office.  
 
It is observed that all the Orders made under the 
1959 Act fall into any one of the critical sectors 
identified by the Government under their critical 
information infrastructure policy. Sectors such as 
national defence and security, law enforcement, 
utilities (water, gas, energy, electricity, etc.), food 
and agriculture, transport, information and 
communications and essential government 
functions/services, as well as banking and finance, 
are reflective of the ten critical sectors laid down in 
the national Cyber Security Policy (NCSP). 
 
Given the above discussion, this study believes 
that the Act plays a crucial role for the protection of 
the nation’s critical information infrastructure, and 
therefore is also an important part of information 
security legal framework in Malaysia. Nevertheless, 
there is still room for improvement to make this 
legislation more effective and efficient for the 
critical information infrastructure protection.  
 
3.3 The law on computer network security 
The recognition of the concept of critical 
information infrastructures necessitates the provision 
of critical computers, i.e. those computer systems 
which are used to operate, monitor, enforce or 
otherwise safeguard the CII. It is noted that in some 
jurisdictions, cybercrime offences treat critical 
computers differently so as to accord greater 
protection. The idea behind this is that the law 
should be sufficiently stringent to prevent harm to 
critical computers. 
 
This area of law is better known as the domain 
of cybercrime or computer crime. Cybercrime is 
generally described as any illegal act that involves a 
computer, its systems, or its applications. It is any 
intentional act associated in any way with computers 
where a victim suffered or could have suffered a loss, 
and a perpetrator made or could have made a gain 
(Ferrera, at. al., p.300). Computers may facilitate the 
commission of ‘old-fashioned’ crimes such as fraud 
or counterfeiting or give rise to new mischief such as 
computer hacking and the deliberate erasure of 
programs or data. Cybercrime today has grown from 
petty offence to massively devastating crime 
(Bainbridge, p. 285). Even way back in 1996, upon 
the discovery of hackers who broke into the US 
Defence Department’s computer more than 160,000 
times, the United States’ General Account Office 
reported that ‘at minimum, these attacks are a 
multimillion-dollar nuisance to the defence. At 
worse, Gringras (p. 211) notes, they are a serious 
threat to national security.’ 
 
Cyber crime law can play a significant role in 
the protection of critical information infrastructure 
by defining the offences and their penalties or 
punishments. The idea lying behind this is that if the 
potential culprit knows that disrupting information 
systems attached to critical information 
infrastructure triggers harsh punishment, the offence 
can be prevented or reduced.  
 
3.3.1 International and comparative perspectives 
At international level cybercrime law is addressed by 
the Council of Europe’s Convention of Cybercrime 
2001, which sets forth broadly four distinct 
substantive criminal offences, which are; (1) 
Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer data or systems; (2) 
Computer-related offences; (3) Content-related 
offences; and (4) Offences involving the 
infringement of intellectual property and related 
rights. Pertaining to the protection of the CII, the 
first category of cybercrime offences above is 
arguably of particular relevance. In the first category 
of substantive offence, the Convention in articles 2-6 
specifically provides for certain types of criminal 
offences such as illegal access, illegal interception, 
data interference, system interference, and misuse of 
devices. Beyond that, certain computer laws in 
different jurisdictions have gone further by providing 
specific provisions for ‘critical computers’ which is 
more responsive to the need to protect CII. 
 
In US, this type of critical information 
infrastructure is defined as ‘protected computer’ 
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1996. It 
refers to the information system that is used 
exclusively by the government or a financial 
institution in which the defendant’s conduct affects 
the government or financial institutions’ operation of 
the computer or to the computer system involved in 
the interstate or foreign commerce and 
communication. 
 
In Singapore, there is a specific provision for 
enhanced punishment for offences involving 
protected computers. Its Computer Misuse Act 1998 
provides in s. 9 that “where access to any protected 
computer is obtained in the commission of an 
offence under section 3, 4, 5 or 7, the person 
convicted of such an offence shall, in lieu of the 
punishment prescribed in those sections, be liable on 
conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years 
or to both.” 
 
For this purpose, s. 9(2) defines the term 
‘protected computer’ as the computer or program or 
data that is used directly in connection with or 
necessary for, among others, the security, defence or 
international relations of Singapore;  the provision 
or services directly related to communications 
infrastructure, banking, and financial services, public 
utilities, public transportation or public key 
infrastructure; or the protection of public safety 
including systems related to essential emergency 
services such as police, civil defence and medical 
services. 
 
3.3.2 Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 
In Malaysia, the main statute that stipulates 
computer crimes have been passed including the the 
Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA) 1998 
and the Computer Crimes Act (CCA) 1997.  
 
CMA 1998 is central to the idea of information 
security protection. This law seeks to uphold the 
national policy objectives, namely among others, to 
ensure information security and network reliability 
and integrity (section 3). To manifest this objective, 
the CMA sets out certain criminal offences that seek 
to prevent or punish those acts that pose threats to 
the information security. Those penal sanctions can 
arguably be classified into four aspects of 
information security, namely: 
 
• Network-related security, reflected in the 
offence of fraudulent use of network 
facilities, etc. in section 232 of the CMA 
1998; 
• Content-related security, as in the offence on 
improper use and offensive content in 
section 233 CMA; 
• Communications security, i.e. on unlawful 
interception and disclosure of 
communications as found in section 234 
CMA; and 
• Physical security, in the form of offence on 
the damage to network facilities and misuse 
of access device and tools as provided in 
sections 235-236 CMA respectively. 
 
3.3.3 Computer Crimes Act 1997 
Beside the CMA 1998, the Computer Crimes Act 
(CCA) 1997 provides for another significant 
measure for protecting critical information 
infrastructure by penalising specifically 
computer-related offences, as follows: 
• Unauthorised access to computer material 
(section 3 CCA 1997); 
• Unauthorised access with intent to commit 
or facilitate commission of further offence (s. 
4); 
• Unauthorised modification of the contents of 
any computer (s. 5); 
• Wrongful communication of means of 
access (s. 6); and 
• Abetments and attempts of any offences 
above (s. 7). 
 
3.3.4 Appraisal 
Be good laws as they may, nevertheless those two 
legislations do not make a distinction on the offences 
based on the types of computers that are affected; 
thus it does not differentiate between a harmless 
hacker who defaces a web-page for fun and a 
cyber-terrorist who desires to cause injury through 
the unauthorised modification of a critical 
computer’s content. On this point, a Malaysian 
cyberlaw expert Professor Abu Bakar Munir in his 
interview with the author (in Kuala Lumpur, 2 June 
2009) supports this proposition and argues that it is 
very important to differentiate ‘normal computer 
system’ with ‘protected computers’ such as those 
used in medical services, governments and so on.  
 
For this matter, Malaysian computer crime law 
needs to be re-looked. As the country’s critical 
information infrastructure such as banking and 
financial institutions, public transport, power and 
utilities, and defence, becomes more dependent on 
computerised system, it is argued that the 
punishment provided under the Act does not 
commensurate with the harm that may be caused by 
malicious intrusion. To address this issue, the Act 
should be expanded in order to prevent bigger threat 
to information security especially those involving the 
nation’s critical information infrastructure. Some 
comparative analysis on what other countries have 
would be useful for coming up with an 
improvement. 
 
It is argued that this approach (of providing 
specific penal offences against harming the critical 
computers) is highly recommended in improving the 
Malaysian legal framework on the protection of CII. 
If the CCA is enhanced to include more stringent 
punishment for any attack on the CII, this will be a 
strong message for future offenders.  
 
4. FINAL REMARKS 
The premise of this paper (of threats and attacks to 
critical information infrastructure) is that as nations 
and critical infrastructure became more dependent on 
computer networks for their operation, new risks are 
created. Such risks take the form of threats to 
national security and public safety. For now, the 
potential deadly threats to the security of critical 
information infrastructure may still look unlikely. 
This situation however should not be a reason to be 
sceptical, lenient or complacent. It is observed that 
this current position is not a static situation as the 
vulnerability of critical information infrastructure to 
cyber attacks could change with the increasing use of 
the network technology (Lewis, p.11). 
  
Malaysia should not be complacent especially 
for two main reasons. First, the security of its critical 
infrastructure is a vital determinant for national 
security, thus it should not be taken lightly, leaving 
the security to a chance—or worse to the hands of 
malicious criminals. Efforts to strengthen the 
security and resilience of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure should be made a priority. 
 
Secondly, the advances of technologies and the 
rise of digital citizens in Malaysia form a part of a 
global network that seek to globalise everything 
from business to governance, from friendship to 
professionalism, and—unfortunately—from crime to 
terrorism. These would soon present a huge 
challenge to all those who are dependant on the 
technology and the information assets.  
 
The policy and legal measures that are discussed 
in this paper arguably constitute as part of a bigger 
framework to secure Malaysian critical infrastructure. 
The law is only one element as other 
components—technology, standards, public-private 
cooperation and the institutions—are worth 
considering, and require further research as well as 
strategic development. By way of analogy, while it is 
correct to regard information as ‘oxygen’ for the 
people and democracy, this paper firmly believes 
that the critical information infrastructures or CII is 
the ‘respiratory system’ in which such oxygen is 
utilised, processed and acted upon. 
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